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SEPARATED AT BIRTH BUT SIBLINGS
NONETHELESS: MIRANDA AND THE DUE
PROCESS NOTICE CASES
George C. Thomas Ill*

Paraphrasing Justice Holmes, law is less about logic than experi
ence.1 Courts and scholars have now had thirty-four years of experi
ence with Miranda v. Arizona,2 including the Court's recent endorse
ment in Dickerson v. United States3 last Term. Looking back over this
experience, it is plain that the Court has created a Miranda doctrine
quite different from what it has said it was creating. I think the ana
lytic structure in Dickerson supports this rethinking of Miranda. To
connect the dots, I offer a new explanation for Miranda that permits
us to reconcile Dickerson and the rest of the post-Miranda doctrine
with the underlying theme of the Miranda opinion.
Consider two Miranda experiences that seem quite contradictory.
The first experience draws upon my teaching of Miranda in my classes
at Rutgers. Among my students, Miranda critics are as rare as the
honest lawyers whom Diogenes sought.4 I can find the loyal opposition
on just about every other issue, but not, oddly enough, on Miranda. I
try deploying the "plain meaning" argument, forcing the students to
read the actual words in the Constitution: "nor shall any person be
compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself."5 It is
clear that the Framers had in mind courtroom testimony. Moreover, I
* Professor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh Sr. Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers,
Newark. - Ed. I received helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper from Paul
Cassell, Sherry Colb, Mike Dorf, Don Dripps, Al Garcia, Richard Leo, John Leubsdorf, Paul
Marcus, Barbara Schweiger, Chris Slobogin, Welsh White, and Charles Whitebread. I also
benefited greatly from presenting a version at a Rutgers faculty colloquium and, of course, at
the "Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law" Symposium sponsored by
the Michigan Law Review and the Michigan Law School's Criminal Law Society. Susan
Klein provided the most help, commenting on several versions and forcing me to clarify my
thoughts. Finally, special thanks to Yale Kamisar. The leading figure in the law of confes
sions for over four decades, Yale always gives generously of his time and wisdom when I
send him a draft, as he did this time. He helps many of us in the academy in many other ways
as well, large and small. I should give the standard disclaimer that no one named in this
footnote should be blamed for what follows.

1. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1984) (quoting
Holmes' "aphorism" that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic").
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
4.
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paraphrase Diogenes loosely!

5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ask, how can we say that a suspect is compelled to be a witness against
himself if he answers "I shot my wife" to the officer's first question of
"what happened last night?" Where is the compulsion? Despite my
efforts, even the conservative students think it is unfair for police to
question suspects without telling them that they need not answer.6
The second experience I offer is that of reading hundreds of ap
pellate opinions deciding whether the police complied with Miranda.
If you have read a few, you will not be surprised at my basic finding once the prosecutor proves that the warnings were given in a language
that the suspect understands, courts find waiver in almost every case.
Miranda waiver is extraordinarily easy to show - basically that the
suspect answered police questions after saying that he understood the
warnings.7 This waiver process bears little resemblance to waiver of
the Fifth Amendment privilege at trial where the prosecutor is not
permitted to badger the defendant with requests that he take the wit
ness stand. Indeed, neither the prosecutor nor the judge can even
comment on the failure of the defendant to testify.8 As most defen
dants are represented by counsel at trial, the decision to take the
stand, and waive the privilege, almost always is made after advice and
careful thought.9 By contrast, the Miranda version of the Fifth
Amendment permits waiver to be made carelessly, inattentively, and
without counsel.1 0
6. In a dissent two years prior to Miranda, Justice White said that "it would be very
doubtful" that a statement would be admissible if the police explicitly told the suspect he
had to answer questions. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J., dis
senting). Of course, this is different from finding a constitutional duty to provide warnings
that suspects need not answer (and White also dissented in Miranda), but White's concern
about police creating a false duty to answer points in the direction of informing suspects that
no duty exists.
7. See, e.g. , North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); see also infra notes 83-95 and
accompanying text.
8. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
9. The defendants who proceed pro se will also have had a rather extensive colloquy
with the trial judge in which, among other warnings, she will tell the defendant that he has a
right not to take the witness stand. See, e.g. , Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392 (1993)
(noting that the trial judge "inquired into" pro se defendant's "awareness of his rights"). We
do not know, of course, how thoroughly a pro se defendant understands this right or how
carefully he considers it. I ndeed, we do not know for certain how carefully or thoughtfully
defendants who are represented by counsel make the decision about testifying, but we would
like to believe that lawyers perform competently and that defendants are rational actors.
10. I confess that the relative ease with which the state can secure waivers of the privi
lege in the grand jury context muddies my point. Grand juries, however, have been consid
ered sui generis in other contexts. In United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992), for exam
ple, the Court held that courts simply lack the authority to require the prosecutor to disclose
favorable evidence to the grand jury, in part because the grand jury is not textually assigned
to any of the three branches of government and, therefore, exists independently of govern
ment. This unique status probably derives from the historic role of the grand jury as a group
of citizens seeking evidence of crime in their midst. As the Court has put the common Jaw
principle: "[T]he public has a right to every man's evidence." Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 443 (1972). But no one ever claimed that every man owes the petit jury at trial his
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These experiences suggest that almost everyone thinks fairness re
quires telling suspects that they do not have to answer police ques
tions, but courts find waiver of the right not to answer on any evidence
that the suspect understood the warnings. Is this really an application
of the venerable privilege not to be compelled to take the witness
stand at trial? More is going on here than meets the eye.
It is good that law does not depend completely on logic. Judged on
that score, Miranda remains quite mysterious. I wish to identify some
of these mysteries and offer a new way of thinking about Miranda that
may explain some of the puzzles. Whatever the Miranda majority con
templated, my thesis is that later, and somewhat hostile, Courts have
transformed Miranda from a case about the Fifth Amendment privi
lege against self incrimination to one about due process.
In Part I of this Article, by way of background, I outline some of
the mysteries left open by the Court's Miranda decision and later ju
risprudence. In Part II, I explore the theoretical and practical disjunc
tion between Miranda and the Fifth Amendment privilege. Part III
then draws on the conceptual and historical bases of due process to
show how a due process understanding may provide answers to some
of Miranda's mysteries. Part IV demonstrates how the Miranda doc
trine and subsequent case law is better explained under a due process
notice theory than under any version of the Fifth Amendment privi
lege theory. Part V offers some tentative thoughts about how best to
justify a Miranda requirement in the Due Process Clause. In Part VI,
I offer some brief comments on Susan Klein's alternative theory for
Miranda. Finally, I conclude that "truth-in-labeling" - the impor
tance of which is emphasized by Professor Klein - requires that due
process theory takes its rightful place in explaining Miranda and its
progeny.
I.

MIRANDA'S MYSTERIES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT

The most basic mystery of Miranda is identifying the full extent of
the holding itself. As Stephen Schulhofer points out,11 there are actu
ally three holdings. The Court held, first, that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies to custodial po
lice interrogation. Second, the Court held that the pressure of custo
dial interrogation is inherently compelling for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment. As to the third holding, the opinion is less than clear.
Professor Schulhofer argues that the Court held that every response to
custodial interrogation is compelled unless warnings are given.12
evidence, or that suspects owe the police their evidence. Thus, the grand jury waiver process
seems a less apt comparison to police interrogation than the process at trial.
1 1 . Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1986).
12. See id. at 446-53.
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Perhaps this is true, although the third holding does not necessarily
follow from the second. It might be that some suspects who answer in
the face of compelling pressure are not actually compelled to answer.
This might be so for three reasons. First, humans surely have different
tolerances for how well they can withstand compelling pressures. Sec
ond, the inherently compelling pressure of police interrogation comes
in quite different levels of pressure. The question "what happened last
night?" might be inherently compelling but it is of a different order of
magnitude from the forty hours of interrogation, thirty of it with no
break, that the defendant faced in Lisenba v. California.13
Third, humans who answer police questions might have
independent motives to answer, motives that have nothing to do with
police compulsion as it is traditionally understood. In Lisenba, for ex
ample, the suspect did not confess until confronted with a confession
of his confederate; Lisenba said that he would never have confessed
but for the statement of the confederate.14 While the police disclosure
of the confederate's confession motivated Lisenba's confession, courts
have never found that providing truthful information to a suspect is
compulsion. The distinction is between enabling the will of the suspect
to operate with more information, which is not compulsion, and over
bearing the will of the suspect. Like all distinctions in confession law,
this one can be spun to gossamer fineness, but in Lisenba, the Court
found that the suspect
exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout his
questioning, and at his trial, which negatives the view that he had so lost
his freedom of action that the statements made were not his but were the
result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse

to answer.15

If it is possible to imagine a noncompelled response to inherently
compelling police pressure (and the Court has on several occasions in
sisted that this is more than just an imaginary possibility),16 then the
'
narrow holding in Miranda is less than clear. Did the Court hold that
every response is· compelled unless accompanied by warnings and
waiver or only that warnings and waiver are required because of the
great risk that any given response will be compelled? Justice White, in
his Miranda dissent, noted both of these formulations of the potential
holding, ultimately deciding on the former - that Miranda held "any
answers to any interrogation to be compelled regardless of the content
and course of examination."17
13. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
14. See id. at 240.
15. Id. at 241.
16. See infra notes 3 8-41 and accompanying text.
17. Miranda

v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
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If the Court held that every statement made by suspects in re
sponse to police interrogation is compelled under the authority of the
Fifth Amendment, this conclusive presumption would presumably ap
ply in all situations just like a finding of "real" Fifth Amendment
compulsion. This is the "strong" reading of Miranda's relationship to
the Fifth Amendment. The conclusive presumption makes it easier to
decide when the constitutional provision has been violated, and noth
ing about the presumption suggests that a presumed violation is some
how less wrongful, or deserves a lesser remedy, than a "real" violation.
This introduces another Miranda mystery. The Court chooses
sometimes not to apply the Miranda presumption of compulsion even
though "actual" compulsion would produce an outcome in favor of the
defendant. In these contexts, the Court insists that the defendant loses
unless he can demonstrate "real" compulsion. Consider New York v.
Quarles,18 where the Court held that Miranda warnings are not re
quired when the police are asking questions designed to advance pub
lic safety. A statement ("the gun is over there") is therefore admissible
even though no warnings are given and Miranda's conclusive pre
sumption would otherwise be fully engaged. Although the Court with
drew the prophylactic protection from this category of cases, it did not
withdraw the pre-Miranda protection against involuntary, compelled,
or coerced statements.19 Thus, the Court assured the reader that the
suspect who loses the benefit of Miranda's conclusive presumption, in
cluding Quarles himself on remand, can argue that his statement was
"actually compelled by police conduct that overcame [his] will to re
sist. "20
As Quarles makes clear, the Court has over the years adopted the
less expansive, or "weak" reading of Miranda's holding - not that
every statement is compelled but that the warnings are necessary be
cause the risk of compulsion is so great. If the warnings are not given,
the presumption of compulsion will usually, but not always, require
suppression of statements made in response to custodial interrogation.
Justice Scalia in his Dickerson dissent suggests that the Court lacks the
authority to structure a presumption in that way.21 I disagree22 but the
18. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
19. Commentators have sought to draw differences between involuntary, compelled,
and coerced statements. See, e.g. , Schulhofer, supra note 1 1 , at 440-53. Whatever the com
mon law approach, or the best philosophical approach, the Court today treats all three as
synonymous. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) (using "presumption of
coercion" and "presumption of compulsion" to explain Miranda's holding); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) (using "coerced," "compelled," and "involuntary" in
terchangeably).
20. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654, 655 n.5.
21. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2337 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stat
ing that the power to impose "useful" prophylactic rules upon Congress and the States "is an
immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not exist").
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novelty of the Miranda presumption requires a better explanation
than the Court has given us. Dickerson explains Quarles with the cli
che that no constitutional rule is absolute. But this misses the point
that Miranda has exceptions where the "real" Fifth Amendment
privilege does not.23 By what standard does the Court decide which
contexts should not benefit from Miranda's conclusive presumption?
This we are never told - another Miranda mystery.
I wish to "solve" these mysteries by introducing a new explanation
of Miranda. In effect, I argue that the Supreme Court has carved out a
specialized niche in the Due Process Clause for Miranda-style due
process. On this view, the notion of a regularized criminal process in
cludes the right to be warned that no duty exists to answer questions
asked during custodial interrogation.
I want to be clear about the kind of claim I am making. It is de
scriptive, not normative. I am not claiming that a due process under
standing of Miranda is the best approach to the problem of police in
terrogation. Nor am I claiming that a due process protection is what
the Miranda Court thought it was creating (though much language in
the opinion is at least consistent with this explanation). Indeed, I think
the Court was doing precisely what Yale Kamisar called for the year
prior to Miranda,24 and what Kamisar, Steve Schulhofer, Larry
Herman (and others) have since claimed25 - it was seeking a test to
22. As does David Strauss. See David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and
Congress, 99 MICH . L. REV. 958 (2001). For his earlier thoughts on the issue generally, see
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. C H I. L. REV. 190 (1988).
23. Yale Kamisar pointed out to me that, in the right case, a court might hold that even
the "real" Fifth Amendment does not prevent coercion, as, for example, if the police are
trying to find a ticking bomb in a school room. Susan Klein makes this argument as well. See
Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 M IC H . L. REV. 1030 (2001). The
Quarles general public safety exception, however, is far broader than the ticking bomb
emergency. More importantly, these speculations do not alter the reality that the Court has
never identified, even in dicta, an exception to the "real" Fifth Amendment privilege.
24. See Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American
Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to . . . , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN OUR TIME 4-1 1 , 64-81 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). Among the many virtues of Ka
misar's paper is his title. The next year, of course, the Court would fill in the ellipsis with
Miranda v. Arizona.
25. See Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old
Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L .J. 733 (1987); Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the
Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntariness " Test, 65 MIC H . L. REV. 59 (1966); Schulhofer, supra note 1 1 ; see also Leslie
A. Lumney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH . U. L. REV. 727,
794 (1999); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HA RV . L. REV. 1826, 1838 (1987). Alfredo Garcia ably expresses a
somewhat different explanation that Miranda was intended to ensure "the continued viabil
ity of confessions as an instrument of law enforcement." Alfredo Garcia, ls Miranda Dead,
Was it Overruled, or is it Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 474 (1998). These views
are not completely antithetical because the Court might have intended to create a bright line
that caused more suppressions and yet left a robust role for interrogation.
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apply to custodial police interrogation that both created a bright line
rule and made suppression more likely than under the due process co
ercion test. The substitution of Fifth Amendment "compulsion" for
due process "coercion" as the relevant inquiry was almost certainly in
tended to lower the bar and make it easier for defendants to suppress
confessions. Focusing on compulsion also made Miranda's crucial pre
sumption easier to justify. It is plausible to claim that police interroga
tion without warnings is always compelling. It is much more difficult to
claim that it is always coercive.26
But Miranda's bright line has been substantially blurred by the
post-Miranda cases.27 Whatever one calls the pressure of police inter
rogation today, it does not always render a response compelled under
the Fifth Amendment because the Court does not always apply the
presumption. My descriptive claim is that the Court has transformed
the Miranda doctrine into a due process protection.
Susan Klein argues that I bend the due process category to make
Miranda fit.28 She argues that I have not identified a due process inter
est to be protected or, assuming a due process interest can be identi
fied, that the bare notice requirement is insufficient to protect the in
terest.29 While I acknowledge that Miranda-style due process is not a
mainstream due process doctrine, my argument is that the Court has
already done the heavy lifting of moving Miranda from the Fifth
Amendment privilege to its next door neighbor in the Fifth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause. Other than to demonstrate that
doctrinal "fact," then, my only job is to find the due process theory
that is the closest fit. In sum, I argue that the Court has already ac
complished the rearranging of the due process furniture that
Professor Klein finds objectionable. Whatever due process has been
understood to require in the past, it is pretty clear that the Due
Process Clause is sufficiently flexible (or amorphous) to accommodate
Miranda-style due process.

26. I indulge here the standard linguistic and philosophical view that coercion entails a
greater magnitude of pressure than compulsion. Prior to Miranda, the Court had never
drawn that distinction in its confessions cases. Miranda was, I believe, intended to be the first
in a series of cases to hold that compulsion can be found where there is insufficient pressure
to constitute coercion. See Schulhofer, supra note 11. The post-Miranda cases, however, con
tinued to talk of compulsion as if it were synonymous with coercion, see supra note 19, an
analytical move that made it easier to find no "actual" compulsion when carving out excep
tions to Miranda.
27. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(noting that the majority's public safety exception "unnecessarily blurs the edges of the clear
line heretofore established").
28. See Susan R. Klein, Commentary, Miranda's Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World
(forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Klein, Miranda's Exceptions].
29. Id.
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THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN MIRANDA AND THE FIFrH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE

There are, I believe, three permissible accounts of Miranda's rela
tionship to the Fifth Amendment privilege. First, as Schulhofer argues,
it might be that every statement made to the police interrogators, in
the absence of warnings and waiver, is conclusively presumed to be
compelled and thus inadmissible on the authority of the Fifth
Amendment.30 On this reading, Miranda is a "strong force" applica
tion of the privilege. A second possible account is that the privilege
applies differently in the interrogation room than it does in the court
room and that sometimes the presumption of compulsion applies and
sometimes it does not. I call this a "weak force" application of the
privilege. The third account is that Miranda is a prophylaxis that pro
tects the privilege rather than being an application of the privilege.
The second and third accounts might appear to be the same but they
are not.
The "weak force" application of the privilege suggests that
Miranda is constitutional and thus beyond the power of Congress to
change in any way. The prophylactic understanding, on the other
hand, leaves room for Congress to legislate provided the legislation is
at least as protective as the Miranda prophylaxis.31 An example of a
prophylaxis that is not an application of a constitutional right is the
Blockburger presumption that a necessarily included offense is the
"same offense" as the greater offense for purposes of preventing mul
tiple punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.32 That presump
tion is a proxy for legislative intent on the multiple punishment issue
and may therefore be overridden by the legislature. It is not part of
the Double Jeopardy Clause, as the Court made clear in
Missouri v. Hunter when it held that "crystal clear" legislative intent to
punish both offenses rebuts the Blockburger presumption.33
The "strong force" understanding of Miranda is open to criticism
for being an ahistorical extension of a right intended to apply only to
trials and other formal hearings. Other policy criticisms build on the
30. See Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 453.
31. Susan Klein argues that Miranda should be viewed as prophylactic rather than a
"weak force" application of the privilege so that Congress and the states would have the op
tion to legislate. See Klein, supra note 23, at 1054.
32. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). For example, joyriding is pre
sumed to be the same offense as auto theft if proving auto theft always proves joyriding. See
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
33. 459 U.S. 359 (1983). For a detailed look at Hunter, see George C. Thomas Ill,
Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense: The Analysis After Missouri v. Hunter, 62
WASH. U. L.Q. 79 (1984). For an extended argument that the multiple punishment presump
tion should also apply in the context of successive prosecutions, see GEORGE C. THOMAS
Ill, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LA W (1998).
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core notion that the Court's conclusive presumption of compulsion is
not empirically defensible and, thus, it makes little sense to exempt
guilty suspects from police interrogation that would probably not, by
the Miranda Court's own admission, rise to the level of due process
coercion.34 Right or wrong as a policy or an historical matter, this un
derstanding of Miranda is coherent.
This understanding, however, fails to explain the post-Miranda
cases carving out exceptions to the original rule. · The best example of
the disconnect between Miranda and the Fifth Amendment is the very
first case in which the Court departed from Miranda's bright line. In
1971, the Court held in Harris v. New York35 that prosecutors can use
statements taken in violation of Miranda to impeach a defendant's
credibility. Seven years after Harris, the Court distinguished Harris in
Portash v. New Jersey36 when it held that a statement "actually com
pelled" by threat of contempt of court cannot be used for impeach
ment later in a criminal case. The analytical structure of
Portash is as important as the holding. Noting that Harris had bal
anced interests to hold against the defendant, Portash wrote:
Balancing of interests was thought to be necessary in Harris ... when the
attempt to deter unlawful police conduct collided with the need to pre
vent perjury. Here, by contrast, we deal with the constitutional privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form. Balanc
ing, therefore, is not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible.37

The central difference between Harris and Portash, according to
the Court, was that the statements in Harris were only presumptively
compelled. The rule is different when the issue is the "pristine" Fifth
Amendment: "[A] defendant's compelled statements, as opposed to
statements taken in violation of Miranda, may not be put to any testi
monial use whatsoever against him in a criminal trial."38 Portash thus
settles the question of whether statements taken in violation of
Miranda are compelled under the Fifth Amendment - they are not.
Recognizing this, the Court often describes the Miranda rights as
prophylactic or "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution
but . . . instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination was protected."39 The clearest expression of this
34. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
35. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
36. 440 U.S. 450 (1979). The Court had reached the same conclusion a year earlier when
the compulsion came not from the contempt power, as in Portash, but from police interroga
tion that constituted "actual compulsion." See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
37. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459.
38. Id.
39. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). I recognize that the first "exception"
to Miranda was in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See discussion supra note 35 and
accompanying text. The Harris opinion, however, did not use the prophylactic locution to
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idea was Oregon v. Elstad.40 The Court held that a Miranda violation
does not taint a subsequent confession taken in compliance with
Miranda, and was at pains to note that Miranda
may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment viola
tion.... Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise volun
tary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be
excluded from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case,

Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant
4
who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.1

This "preventive medicine" explanation of Miranda minimizes the
role of the Fifth Amendment in explaining why statements must be
suppressed. On this view, not all violations of Miranda produce consti
tutional harm, giving the Court flexibility to approach issues about the
scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule as well as exceptions to its pre
sumption of compulsion. While a prophylactic explanation might not
be the best understanding of what Miranda originally sought to ac
complish, or the best approach to the problem of police interrogation,
nothing keeps a Court from modifying its doctrine. This explanation of
Miranda, whether right or wrong as a policy matter, is coherent.
The difficulty is Dickerson, where the Court seemed to suggest that
Miranda is more than a prophylactic rule or, perhaps, that it is a con
stitutional prophylactic rule that Congress has no power to modify.
Given the Court's citation to City of Boerne v. Flores42 for the proposi
tion that "Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions in
terpreting and applying the Constitution,"43 and the Court's applica
tion of this principle to Miranda, it is difficult to avoid reading
Dickerson as holding that Miranda is constitutional - either in a
strong sense, as co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege, or
in a weak sense, as a constitutionally required prophylactic rule.
If Miranda is best understood, in light of Dickerson, as constitu
tional in the strong sense, the exceptions and doctrinal limitations
made on the authority of the prophylactic theory seem doomed. If
Portash is the right approach to the use of compelled statements to
impeach, and if Miranda is co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment
privilege, then Harris must be overruled. This analytical turn is, I
think, Paul Cassell's nightmare. He challenges Miranda, loses, and
takes down with him the doctrinal limitations placed on Miranda. Unjustify permitting the use of statements taken in violation of Miranda to impeach defendants.
Rather, it simply assumed that the interests in reliable fact-finding were heavier than what
ever interests supported a total ban on statements presumed to be compelled.
40. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
41. Id. at 306-07.
42. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
43. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (2000).
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doubtedly fearing this analytical challenge, the Court in Dickerson
embraced the entire doctrinal superstructure created with the pro
phylactic understanding.44 That language is dicta, however, and it
might be that Dickerson is the beginning of the end for some or all of
those doctrinal limitations.
If, on the other hand, we accept the Dickerson dicta that Miranda
is constitutional in the weak sense - that it is a constitutionally re
quired prophylactic theory - the exceptions survive but without a
theory that explains why the Fifth Amendment privilege deserves a
constitutional prophylaxis that does not apply to some cases in which
the Fifth Amendment itself would apply. While that kind of prophy
laxis is not illegitimate, it requires an explanation. One explanation is
that the Court is making the Fifth Amendment privilege do work it
was never intended to do and, consequently, has had to remodel the
privilege. In effect, to view Miranda as a weak version of the Fifth
Amendment privilege requires that we recognize the Fifth
Amendment as having a strong force in formal proceedings and a
weak force in police interrogation. Nothing keeps the Court from
having a Fifth Amendment privilege with a strong and a weak force,
but it is a conceptually unsatisfying interpretation of a single guaran
tee.
A due process theory offers an alternative account that avoids the
problem of constructing a theory of the Fifth Amendment with weak
and strong forces. Due process requires notice in other contexts before
rights to liberty or property are lost. Why not in the context of police
interrogation? I think a permissible understanding of Miranda is that
it protects the liberty interest in not being subjected to custodial· inter
rogation by providing notice that the suspect can terminate the inter
view. While this is a novel "liberty interest," it is one that Miranda it
self seemed to contemplate. The Court said that "custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty."45 And the
Miranda solution, after all, was to tell the suspect that he has a "right
to remain silent" as a way of terminating the deprivation of liberty
that attends custodial interrogation.
This "right," however, does not exist outside the context of police
interrogation. Witnesses can be subpoenaed, given immunity, and
compelled to testify consistently with the Fifth Amendment privilege.46
Defendants who take the witness stand can be fully cross-examined.47
No "right to remain silent" exists when the "real" Fifth Amendment

44. Id. at 2334-36.
45. Miranda

v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966).

46. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
47. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
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privilege is involved.48 Miranda is so loosely connected to the Fifth
Amendment privilege that it promises a right that the privilege itself
cannot deliver. This should suggest rethinking the relationship of
Miranda to the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Even if we assume that Miranda is constitutional in the weak
sense, and thus not very closely connected to the privilege, we require
an alternative theory - such as due process - to explain when the
Court will apply, or refuse to apply, the presumption or when it will
create a broader right than the Fifth Amendment creates in its strong
force form that applies to formal proceedings. Yale Kamisar's classic
study of confessions law that paved the way for Miranda draws heavily
on equal protection to conclude that suspects should be told of their
Fifth Amendment privilege before being interrogated.49 Drawing a
parallel to cases requiring the state to provide indigent defendants
with a transcript and a lawyer to handle their appeal,50 Professor
Kamisar argued that "respect for the individual and securing equal
treatment in law enforcement" require the state to make counsel
available to suspects who face police interrogation and to warn them
that they need not answer.51 As Professor Kamisar put it: "To the ex
tent that the Constitution permits the wealthy and the educated to 'de
feat justice,' if you will, why shouldn't all defendants be given a like
opportunity?"52 If the Fourteenth Amendment helps us decide to ap
ply the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation, rather than
just in formal proceedings, Fourteenth Amendment due process may
help decide when and how the Miranda presumption should be ap
plied.
48. The text and history are also inconsistent with a "right to remain silent" view of the
Fifth Amendment privilege. The text forbids compelling a witness to testify. That is far from
a general right to remain silent. Moreover, Albert Alschuler has concluded that no one in
the eighteenth century would have thought of the common law privilege as creating a right
to silence. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right
to Remain Silent , 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996).
49. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 4-1 1 , 64-81. Professor Kamisar's paper laid out the theory
that the privilege against self-incrimination should apply to the police interrogation room
and that notions of equal protection required providing suspects notice that they did not
have to answer questions.
50. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (transcript). About the only erroneous prediction Professor Kamisar
made in his Equal Justice paper, see supra note 24, was that Douglas would turn out to be a
more important right to counsel case than Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The
prediction was based on Professor Kamisar's view that the Equal Protection Clause was go
ing to play a key role in deciding how to apply the criminal procedure guarantees. The
Court's appetite for using the Equal Protection Clause in this way, however, turned out to be
quite limited. See, e.g. , Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (refusing to extend Douglas to a
discretionary second appeal to the state supreme court even though indigents are unques
tionably disadvantaged by not having appointed counsel).
51. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 79-80.
52. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 80.
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On this understanding of Miranda, the difficult questions have
been, and will continue to be, about when and how to apply the pre
sumption, questions not answered by asserting that Miranda presumes
Fifth Amendment compulsion. My due process account fills in this gap
either by operating as the mechanism by which we decide when the
"weak force" Fifth Amendment applies or operating as a free-standing
source of the duty to warn. On either view, it is the Due Process
Clause that does the analytical work.
Ill. Is MIRANDA ABOUT DUE PROCESS NOTICE OR "WEAK FORCE"
FIFfH AMENDMENT COMPULSION?: A LOOK AT THE CONCEPTUAL
AND HISTORICAL B ASIS OF DUE PROCESS

Professor Klein argues that the Fifth Amendment right not to be
compelled to be a witness against oneself is the only right one needs,
or is permitted to use, to craft doctrines that warn of a right to si
lence.53 In effect, she. claims that the existence of the criminal proce
dure guarantees of the Bill of Rights sucked most of the "criminal
process" oxygen from the Due Process Clause, exhausting it of content
in the criminal context - at least where there is a plausible nexus be
tween a particular right and the government action being challenged.54
But I believe that the criminal procedure guarantees in the Bill of
Rights leave room for the Due Process Clause to work when we think
about the controls that should apply to police interrogation.
History supports the idea that due process has independent life in
the criminal context. The clause derives from the Magna Carta re
quirement that all persons are entitled to the "law of the land," a
hoary phrase that has been understood for centuries to require a
regularized process before the state can deprive someone of life, lib
erty, or property.55 The Framers of the Fifth Amendment created a
right to "due process of law" that courts understood to be equivalent
to the Magna Carta right to the "law of the land. "56 The Fifth
Amendment privilege is a separate protection in the Fifth
Amendment from that of due process (the two clauses are located
next to each other, separated by a comma). Separate provisions must
mean something different, and when the privilege applies, it does in
deed provide all the process that is due. But how would the
Framers have understood the application of the privilege?
53. See Klein, supra note 23, at 53.
54. This additional condition is needed to preserve a place for due process or equal pro
tection to operate in areas when no specific right seems to apply - for example, to create a
rule that equal protection forbids a prosecutor to act if motivated by a racially discriminatory
purpose. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1 1 8 U.S.
356 (1886).
55. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 1 1 0 U.S. 516 (1884).
56. Id. at 528-32.
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Scholars as diverse as Yale Kamisar and John Henry Wigmore
agree that the privilege has a different history from that of the com
mon law rule forbidding the use of involuntary confessions.57 The
privilege grew out of the concern with the power of the monarch to
compel political and religious dissenters to take an oath to tell the
truth in formal hearings.58 Part of the objection to this process was that
the state could force anyone to take the oath, even if it lacked a basis
to suspect the particular individual, thus allowing the monarch to seek
out and destroy its opponents. Part of the objection, however, was that
the state should not have the power to compel a person to destroy
himself even if the state had adequate suspicion. In 1651, Hobbes
stated that even a "justly condemned" person has "the Liberty to dis
obey" the sovereign when it orders him to "kill, wound, or mayme
himselfe [sic]."59 From this principle, Hobbes derived the following
corollary: "If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign [sic], or his
Authority, concerning a crime done by himselfe [sic], he is not bound
(without assurance of Pardon) to confess it; because no man . . . can be
obliged . . . to accuse himselfe [sic]."60 Here, what is being protected is
the autonomy of the subject and the corresponding right to ignore the
order of the sovereign to confess a crime. The idea made the voyage
across the Atlantic. In 1677, the Virginia House of Burgesses "de
clared that forcing suspects to answer incriminating questions under
oath was incompatible with their natural rights."61
The common law simultaneously developed another principle that
overlapped the Hobbesian right to ignore the sovereign's order to ac
cuse oneself. Confessions had to be voluntary to be admissible. The
underlying concern was not autonomy as much as it was reliability of
the fact finding process. For example, Blackstone noted that confes
sions made out of court are "the weakest and most suspicious of all
testimony, ever liable to be obtained by artifice, false hopes, promises
of favor, or menaces, seldom remembered accurately, or reported with
due precision, and incapable in their nature of being disproved by
other negative evidence."62
57. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2266 (3d ed. 1940) ; Kamisar, supra note 24,
at 26-27. Historians also agree. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT (1968) ; Alschuler, supra note 48; R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European lus Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962
(1990) ; John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994).
58. See Alschuler, supra note 48, at 2638-47 .
59. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHIAN 268-69 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books
1984).
60. Id. at 269.
61. Alschuler, supra note 48, at 2651.
.
62. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 357 (John
L. Wendell ed., New York, Harper & Bros. 1854).
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If we were able to ask the Framers whether any part of the Fifth
Amendment was relevant to interrogation of suspects, they would al
most certainly reply in the negative, asserting that the common law
prohibition of involuntary confessions would do the job. If we insisted,
however, that something in the Fifth Amendment be put to that task,
the Framers would likely propose the Due Process Clause rather than
the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself. They
would see the latter provision as preventing Congress or the judiciary
from creating procedures that would require individuals to answer
questions under oath in a criminal trial.63 If the common law were sud
denly not available to protect against the use of involuntary confes
sions (as it is not available today except to the extent it survives in
cases decided under the Due Process Clause), the Framers would
probably agree that part of the "process" that is "due" is the right not
to have involuntary confessions used to prove guilt.
Indeed, I believe we can push this thought experiment a bit fur
ther. It would be silly to claim that the Framers contemplated any kind
of Miranda-style notice of the right not to answer questions. But con
sider how they might respond if they accepted the Miranda Court's
finding that, to prevent compelled responses to police interrogation
(not under oath), it was necessary to warn suspects that they have no
duty to answer police questions. Now we ask again: Given that this
right exists and must be located somewhere in the Bill of Rights,
where would it go? I cannot prove my answer, of course (which is why
this is a thought experiment), but I am confident that the Framers
would locate this new right to a particular kind of process in the Due
Process Clause rather than in the right not to be compelled to answer
questions under oath. The law that existed in 1791 drew a very bright
line between compelling answers under oath (a procedure that was
subject to the common law privilege) and compelling answers not un
der oath (a procedure subject to the common law rule prohibiting the
use of involuntary confessions).
Having enlisted the Framers of the Fifth Amendment to support
my argument, I now turn to the Framers of the Fourteenth Amend
ment. It contains a Due Process Clause worded identically to the one
in the Fifth Amendment, thus extending the due process limitation on
government power to the states. Whatever else is true about the de
bates over the Fourteenth Amendment - for example, whether the
Framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the
criminal procedure guarantees in the Bill of Rights64 - one fact is
63. That Congress has never attempted to require that kind of procedure simply attests
to the core settled meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g. , George C. Thomas
III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. 1819 (1997).
64. See George C. Thomas Ill, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers' Bill ofRights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2001).
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clear. The Framers did not think that the Bill of Rights guarantees ex
hausted the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment imposed limi
tations on state criminal processes. Michigan Senator Jacob Howard,
who was on the Reconstruction Committee that drafted the
Amendment, favored a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that
incorporated the "personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by the
first eight amendments of the Constitution."65 He noted, however, that
the Amendment also protected due process of law and equal protec
tion of the laws.66 Howard thus contemplated that the incorporation of
the Bill of Rights left room for the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to operate as an independent limitation on the states.
As an example of the protection of due process and equal protection,
he said: "It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which
the white man is not to be hanged."67 While the distinction between
equal protection and due process is unclear in Howard's example, it
seems that Howard found a role for due process to play in preventing
this hanging. If so, it is a role that is independent of the first eight
amendments. Moreover, the example strongly suggests a kind of "law
of the land" rule that black men are due the same process as white
men.
An opponent of the Fourteenth Amendment gave the following
example of how the Amendment would limit state criminal processes:
[I] f a murderer be arrested, tried, convicted and sentenced to be hung, he
may claim the protection of the new constitutional provision, allege that
a State is about to deprive him of life without due process of law, and ar
rest all further proceedings until the Federal Government shall have in

quired [into the case ].68

This example assumes a free-standing due process protection by which
state criminal proceedings can be evaluated.
The Court has explicitly turned to due process in other criminal
contexts even though the issue seemed, logically, to lie within the am
bit of a particular procedural guarantee. For example, the Court ana
lyzed whether a state must allow a defendant access to exculpatory re
cords within its control as a due process question, even though it might
logically be thought to be an issue of Sixth Amendment compulsory
process.69 Additionally, the Court found due process violated when a
state's evidence law prevented the defendant from putting on his ex-

65. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
66. See id. at 2766.
67. Id.
68. Letter from Orville H. Browning, Secretary of the Interior, to Colonel W.H.
Benneson and Major H.V. Sullivan (Oct. 13, 1866), in CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, Oct. 26,
1866 at 2.
69. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
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culpatory evidence even though the specific deprivations were of the
Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses and to have compul
sory process.70
Does due process provide a comfortable "home" for notice that a
suspect does not have a duty to answer police questions? Consider an
other thought experiment suggested by Yale Kamisar.71 Suppose the
Warren Court had decided that it was too much of a stretch to apply
the Fifth Amendment privilege to the police interrogation room.
Could it have used its due process cases to create a Miranda-like rule?
I believe the answer is yes.
In Blackburn v. Alabama,72 the Court held involuntary on due pro
cess grounds the confession given by a suspect suffering from mental
illness. Blackburn's due process analysis tracks Miranda's Fifth
Amendment privilege analysis pretty closely. Both are concerned with
the ability of the suspect to make a decision based on "a rational in
tellect and a free will."73 Blackburn holds that a confession not so
based is a violation of due process. The piece that is missing in
Blackburn is a global concern with the effect on suspects of all police
interrogation, not just the particular one under the Court's micro
scope. In the next three years, however, the Court began to expand its
due process focus.
In Lynumn v. Illinois,74 the Court commented that the suspect
"was encircled in her apartment by three police officers and a twice
convicted felon who had purportedly 'set her up.' There was no friend
or adviser to whom she might turn. "75 Though the police also made a
threat (to have her children taken from her), it is significant that the
Court considered the coercive effect of being "encircled" by police
without "friend or adviser to whom she might turn." These coercive
pressures would be true in almost every case of custodial police inter
rogation.
In Haynes v. Washington,76 decided two months after Lynumn, the
Court found compulsion without a threat beyond that of further in
communicado interrogation. The concern in Haynes was the effect on
suspects generally of incommunicado interrogation. Here is what the
Court said, near the end of its opinion - a passage that surely
presages Miranda:

70. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
71. Professor Kamisar offered this idea in a question during the symposium.
72. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
73. Id. at 208.
74. 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
75. Id. at 534.
76. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
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We cannot blind ourselves to what experience unmistakably teaches: that

even apart from the express threat, the basic techniques present here -

the secret and incommunicado detention and interrogation - are de
vices adapted and used to extort confessions from suspects . . . . [W]e do
not mean to suggest that all interrogation of witnesses and suspects is
impermissible. Such questioning is undoubtedly an essential tool in effec
tive law enforcement. The line between proper and permissible police
conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best,
a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is neces
sary to make fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive
pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an accused.77

The Miranda Court could have relied on Blackburn, Lynumn, and
Haynes to hold that custodial police interrogation is inherently a dep
rivation of due process liberty unless the suspect is warned that he has
a right to terminate the interrogation. The Court chose a different
path, of course, probably in part because the due process path would
have required the Court to overrule prior cases permitting some pretty
rough interrogation techniques78 as well cases refusing to find due pro
cess violations even when the suspect requested counsel.79 As the Fifth
Amendment privilege had only applied to the states for two years
when Miranda was decided,80 there were no contrary Fifth
Amendment precedents to be overruled. Moreover, it is difficult to
read the Miranda opinion without getting the sense that the Court
thought the Fifth Amendment privilege was a clearer, cleaner solution
than a thorough overhaul of the due process doctrine. Now that the
Fifth Amendment solution has been blurred and warped, however,
there is no reason the Court cannot reconsider what is the best doc
trinal home for a Miranda rule. If a due process home is a better fit in
the twenty-first century, the Court should embrace it.
Is due process a better fit? One reason to prefer a due process un
derstanding, touched on earlier, is that Miranda waiver looks very dif
ferent from waiving the privilege at trial. The Miranda opinion hints
that the Court expected a high percentage of suspects to invoke the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel. Had that occurred, one
could argue that the Miranda protection of the privilege was sturdy
enough, in an informal way, for rough parity with the formal court
room application of the privilege. If most suspects say nothing that
could be used against them later, or if they request counsel to advise
them about answering police questions, there would be little practical
77. Id. at 514-15.
78. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). For a more detailed discussion
of this case, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g. , Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (rejecting the claim that failure
to honor suspect's request for counsel violated Due Process Clause).
80. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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difference, in the total universe of cases, between the Miranda protec
tion and that of the "real" Fifth Amendment privilege. But that is not
the reality of how Miranda operates. Roughly eighty percent of all
suspects waive Miranda, and the vast majority of those suspects in
criminate themselves.81 This is not parity with the courtroom applica
tion and its waiver standard. As Professor Kamisar said in 1965, "if the
privilege is easily waived, there is really no privilege at all."82
The Court's language in Miranda could be read to require consid
erably more to prove waiver than has turned out to be the standard.
The Court wrote: "If the interrogation continues without the presence
of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly. and intelli
gently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
retained or appointed counsel."83 But the whole concept of Fifth
Amendment waiver is oddly attached to the "weak" force of the Fifth
Amendment that seems to explain Miranda. Part of what has given
Miranda critics traction all these years is the incongruity of asking
whether a suspect has waived his right not to be compelled to answer
questions. How can one waive the right not to be compelled? It makes
sense to think about waiving the Fifth Amendment privilege in the
context of a trial - by choosing to testify, the defendant waives the
right she has not to be subpoenaed to testify. But because police can
not compel suspects to answer under penalty of contempt, the notion
of waiving the right not to be compelled in the interrogation room
borders on the incoherent.84 This conceptual oddity makes the task of
fashioning a waiver standard in the police interrogation room compa
rable to that in the courtroom more difficult, even if the Court had the
political will to attempt to do so.
Due process, by comparison, does not require an affirmative,
counseled waiver. The prisoner facing loss of good time credits and
the parolee facing parole revocation can waive the right to a hearing
by simply not appearing after notice has been given.85 To be sure, one
could describe the non-appearance in these cases as forfeiture, rather
81. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996); Richard A. Leo,
Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996).
82. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 33 (quoting Note, The Privilege Against Self
Incrimination: Does it Exist in the Police Station?, 5 STAN. L. REV. 459, 477 (1953)).
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
84. The standard response to that argument is that Miranda created (or found in the
Fifth Amendment) a right to silence. See, e.g. , R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and
Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15 (1981) (articulating and critiquing this
conception of the Fifth Amendment); see also discussion supra notes 57-63 and accompany
ing text.
85. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972); see also discussion infra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
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than waiver, but nothing turns on the formalistic label that is applied.
What counts is that the prisoner and the parolee had notice and failed
to exercise the right about which they were notified. The suspect in the
police interrogation room can similarly waive Miranda by listening to
the warnings and talking to the police. Talking to the police is a failure
to exercise the relevant right in the same way as failing to appear at
the parole revocation hearing. Waiver can be found even in a case
where the suspect refuses to sign the waiver form and states, "I will
talk to you but I am not signing any form."86 To compare that to the
decision to take the witness stand in a criminal trial is to diminish the
Fifth Amendment privilege.
The distinction: between Fifth Amendment waiver at trial and due
process waiver becomes clearer in two of the Court's Miranda cases.
In Connecticut v. Barrett,87 the Court upheld waiver when the suspect
answered orally even though he said he would not sign a statement un
til his lawyer appeared. In Colorado v. Spring,88 the Court found
waiver even though the suspect did not know he was going to be inter
rogated for a more serious crime than the one for which he was under
arrest. Do these cases meet due process standards for notice? I think
so. In both cases; the suspect knew he did not have to answer police
questions and that he could have a lawyer present during the interro
gation. That he lacked perfect information in Spring or made an illogi
cal decision in Barrett does not mean he lacked notice of the conse
quence of answering police questions or of his right to counsel and to
terminate the interview. The argument is more difficult, however, if
one has to conclude that either Spring or Barrett was no longer react
ing to the inherent compulsion of police interrogation when they an
swered questions while holding a warped or incomplete understanding
of what they faced.89
In addition to the way waiver is proved, what happens after waiver
further distinguishes Miranda from the Fifth Amendment privilege
that attends the trial. At trial, the defendant who waives the Fifth
Amendment privilege and takes the witness stand has "his lawyer . . .
at his side, not only to shield him from oppressive or tricky cross
examination which angers, upsets, or confuses him, but to guide him
on direct examination."90 The Court has even said that "to prevent a

86. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 371 (1979).
87. 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
88. 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
89. One reader of a draft, citing Barrett and Spring, suggested that the Miranda version
of notice is too thin to qualify as due process notice. Perhaps, but this argument proves too
much. If Miranda notice is too thin for the Due Process Clause, it is surely too thin to warn
effectively of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
90. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 13 (internal footnote omitted).
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defendant's lawyer from guiding him o n direct examination constitutes
a per se violation of 'fundamental fairness.' "91
When a suspect waives Miranda, the only limitation on police in
terrogation is the Due Process Clause, the very protection that
Miranda found unacceptably parsimonious. And in the hands of later
courts, the due process protection is pretty parsimonious. Alfredo
Garcia provides a dramatic example of what courts will permit police
to do once they have a waiver.92 In this case, the courts found a confes
sion voluntary despite thirty hours of continuous interrogation without
sleep followed by another fourteen hours of interrogation after the
suspect slept for six hours. The Garcia example is not an isolated case,
nor is it in any way antithetical to Miranda doctrine as it has evolved.
A North Carolina case, State v. Jackson,93 provides another example.
Jackson was a murder suspect. He waived Miranda and was inter
viewed for three hours and released; the next day, again waiving
Miranda, he was questioned and told that the clothes he wore the day
of the murder were stained with blood, and that tracks made by his
tennis shoes were found at the scene of the crime. Both statements
were false. Jackson did not confess. Ten days later, he voluntarily
came to the police station and waived Miranda; he was shown a
bloody fingerprint on a knife. The police said that the print on the
knife was Jackson's and that an eyewitness could identify him leaving
the murdered woman's apartment carrying a knife. Both statements
were, once again, false. In addition, the officers warned that, if
Jackson denied what he had done, they would "go into court and . . .
testify that the defendant was a black man raping and killing white
women."94 Jackson confessed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that it was admissible under the Due Process Clause.
Miranda doctrine could have developed differently; perhaps the
Fifth Amendment privilege contains a non-waivable core that forbids
trickery and oppressive interrogations inconsistent with the "free
choice" rationale in the Miranda opinion. The Supreme Court, how
ever, has not provided guidance on these questions, and the state
courts permit considerable deception and pressure without finding a
due process violation.95 Thus, for eighty percent of suspects, the law
91. Id. at 1 6 (citing, and later quoting from, Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 594
(1961)).
92. See Garcia, supra note 25, at 499-502.
93. State v. Jackson, 304 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1983).
94. Id. at 140.
95. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986) (deception and pressure);
Sheriff v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618 (Nev. 1996) (deception); Arthur v. Commonwealth, 480
S.E.2d 749 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (deception); cf. State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1989} (holding inadmissible as coerced a confession made after police showed the
suspect fabricated scientific evidence prepared on the stationery of a state department of
criminal law enforcement); see also Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices:
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that applies is not in fact Miranda but the law that Miranda sought to
change. It seems odd, at best, to say that the Fifth Amendment re
quires suspects to be warned that they have a privilege not to answer
police questions, but that once they agree to answer, they are in the
due process soup where police can lie and cheat to get a confession.
This view of the Fifth Amendment impoverishes it.
This evidence suggests that Miranda is not really about the Fifth
Amendment privilege. No, my students had it right all along
Miranda is about fair notice that suspects have no duty to answer po
lice questions. Once the police give that notice, the basic rationale of
Miranda is satisfied and everyone is happy. The suspect gets the notice
he deserves, the police get a statement, the prosecutor gets a convic
tion, and the appellate court will affirm (as long as the suspect under
stands the language in which the warnings are given).
Because the Due Process Clause sometimes forbids the state from
taking advantage of structural inequities in the level of information,96
it makes sense to think of Miranda as a due process case rather than a
case about compelled self-incrimination. But why limit the due process
notice to custodial interrogation? Structural inequities in information
about the right of the suspect not to answer questions or to refuse to
give consent to search exist in a myriad of contexts.97 Why not a right
to due process notice every time any state actor asks a question of
anyone?
A superficial answer, at the doctrinal level, is that this was as far as
the Miranda Court was willing to go. A deeper kind of answer is found
in the reason the Due Process Clause requires notice. Here, I agree
with one of the Court's premises in Miranda, if not its ultimate conclu
sion. There is a rough and ready difference in the level of pressure be
tween typical cases of police approaching an individual on the street
and asking a question, and police conducting a sustained interrogation
of a suspect who is under arrest.98 Under arrest, in an unfamiliar room,

-

How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1 1 68 (2001); Welsh White, Miranda 's Failure to
Restrain Pernicious Police Interrogation Tactics, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001).

96. For example, due process forbids the state from using a probate system that relies on
constructive notice to creditors when the creditor is known or might reasonably be ascer
tained. See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
97. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (holding that no Miranda warn
ings were necessary because the suspect was not under arrest or otherwise in custody even
though he was a parolee who was being interrogated in the police station); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that a consent search is valid if the consent is vol
untarily given based on the totality of the circumstances, without requiring that the suspect
knew of the right to refuse consent).
98. Professor Kamisar agrees here. Taking Miranda at its literal word that it applies to
anyone who is "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), Professor Kamisar argued in 1966 that the case for ap
plying Miranda to stops on the street was much more difficult. See Kamisar. supra note 25, at
60 n.8. The bright line between an approach on the street and an interrogation blurs as we
add arrest and interrogation elements to the street stop - for example, detention for several
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suspects face police interrogators who are capable of relentless ques
tioning and who imply, if they do not state, that the suspect must an
swer. This is about as extreme a pressure to answer as interrogation
can produce short of physical coercion or threats of physical coercion.
I can adopt, therefore, the Miranda Court's factual premise that cus
todial police interrogation creates inherently compelling pressure to
answer the questions.
My due process explanation does not, however, have to take the
next step and conclusively presume that any answer in the absence of
warnings and waiver is therefore compelled within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment. Compelling pressures can exist without causing the
actor to behave in a particular way. In Robert Nozick's classic account
of coercion, for example, the last condition states that part of the ac
tor's reason for doing X (for confessing) must be to avoid (or lessen
the likelihood of) the thing that has been threatened.99 If that condi
tion is not met, the actor has been subjected to coercion but has not
been coerced.'00 In other words, the existence of a threat does not en
tail that the threat caused the actor to do something.
Compelling pressures can exist without the suspect succumbing to
them. We act out of many motives that intersect in complex psycho
logical ways, and we are differentially susceptible to varying levels of
pressure. To ask the suspect what he did last night might be, in some
way, compelling if he thinks he has a duty to answer, but it is far less
compelling than the pressure that Lisenba faced during forty hours of
interrogation.101 Moreover, recall that the Court found that Lisenba
confessed not because of the interrogation but because he chose to
shift blame to his confederate. The single most telling criticism of the
Miranda conceptual structure is the assumption that every answer to
every question posed by police interrogators is compelled. It flies in
the face of our pragmatic, intuitive view of human nature as well as
what philosophers have taught us about compulsion. As far back as
Aristotle, philosophers noted that the decision to act in a way one
does not want to act is voluntary, in a sense, because it is a decision
made by the actor. 1 02
minutes and intense questioning - but the Court is committed to drawing a line at arrest for
purposes of triggering Miranda. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
99. See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 102-04
(Peter Laslett et al. eds., 1972).
100. Peter Westen makes the same distinction in Peter Westen, "Freedom " and
"Coercion" - Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541.
101. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). For a more detailed discussion of
this case, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
102. ARISTOTLE, 3 ETHICS § 1 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Rev. ed. 1976). To be
sure, the free will premise underlying Aristotle's view of voluntariness ultimately defeats the
notion of an involuntary confession. Wigmore famously observed, "As between the rack and
a false confession, the latter would usually be considered the less disagreeable; but it is none
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Miranda had to embrace the pragmatically and philosophically du
bious premise that every response is a compelled response to justify
suppressing statements under the authority of the Fifth Amendment
privilege in every case where warnings are not given. If one is disposed
to accept that premise, however, it is not clear that a set of warnings
delivered by the actors who are creating the inherent compulsion is a
sufficient remedy. Miranda is a glass half full no matter how it is held
to the light, a recognition of the essential compromise that has always
been at the heart of Miranda. If the inherent compulsion of police in
terrogation really compels every response, a better remedy seems re
quired. If the inherent compulsion does not compel every response,
we are left with a "weak force" understanding of Miranda without a
clear account of when and how it will differ from the "pristine" privi
lege.
A due process right to notice that suspects do not have to answer
police questions does not require the assumption that the suspect is
compelled to answer in every case where warnings are not given. The
compelling pressures of custodial police interrogation simply provide a
justification for limiting the notice to that category. Viewing the
warnings as required under a due process notice theory avoids the
"glass half full" conceptual problem. It accomplishes precisely what
the "weak force" explanation accomplishes but provides an account,
however imprecise, of when warnings are required and when the fail
ure to warn should not lead to suppression. It achieves what the Court
now achieves with Fifth Amendment privilege "strong" and "weak"
forces by moving the "weak" protection into the Due Process Clause
and thus avoiding the awkwardness of finding two quite different
kinds of protection in a single constitutional guarantee.

IV. THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE UNDERSTOOD AS REQUIRING DUE
PROCESS NOTICE

The Miranda opinion is itself somewhat consistent with a notice
explanation. Some of the examples the Court drew from the interroga
tion manuals do not create what is normally considered compulsion the less voluntarily chosen." 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 824 n.l (Chadbourn
rev. 1970). One could quite plausibly array the various approaches to the confession problem
on a free will-determinism spectrum with Aristotle, Wigmore, and Lisenba near the free will
pole and Miranda near the determinism pole. For some thoughts on the various historical
and philosophical approaches to confessions, see George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical
Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79 (1993) (hereinafter
Thomas, Philosophical Account]; George C. Thomas I I I & Marshall D. Bilder,
Aristotle's Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243
(1991). Whatever approach one adopts, some gross distinctions are possible - for example,
asking a suspect whether he has anything to say versus a relentless interrogation with threats
of physical coercion. Miranda's casual assumption that these two situations are indistin
guishable for Fifth Amendment purposes has always been controversial.
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for example, feigning sympathy or pretending to give the suspect an
excuse for the killing. In each of these situations, the suspect makes a
free choice, based on the information available to him. What makes
these routines questionable is not compulsion, as traditionally under
stood, but the unfairness that comes with making a choice based on
incomplete or false information. This would not have to be described
as compulsion. It might better be described as a failure of informa
tion.103
The focus in Miranda generally is on the police-created atmos
phere that leads the suspect to believe that he has an obligation legal, moral, or pragmatic - to answer police questions. For example,
in discussing how to deal with a request for a lawyer, the interrogation
manuals recommend that the suspect be told to save himself and his
family the expense because all the police want is the truth from the
suspect. "You can handle this by yourself."104 In discussing how to re
spond to a refusal to answer questions, the manuals suggest noting the
natural inference that anyone would draw from a refusal to answer,
that the suspect is guilty. "So let's sit here and talk the whole thing
over."105 At one point, the Court concludes, after analyzing the police
training manuals, that the interrogator's aim is to "persuade, trick, or
cajole [the suspect)" into confessing.106
As Miranda critics are quick to point out, however, persuasion and
cajoling are not compulsion, at least as it is classically defined.107 In
deed, even trickery may not rise to the level of Fifth Amendment
compulsion.108 The focus in the opinion is on Miranda-style compul
sion, a concept that seems more concerned with a level playing field
and the "free choice" about answering police questions than anything
else. Supplying information was thought sufficient to permit a "free
choice," which strongly suggests that the compulsion concerning the
Court was a failure of information rather than the level of pressure in
any individual case.
·

1 03. To be sure, on a "thick" account of compulsion, one with its roots in notions of
positive liberty, a failure of relevant information can be viewed as compelling. See generally
Thomas, Philosophical Account, supra note 102 (describing that account but rejecting it as
an explanation of Miranda's holding).
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 454 (1966) (quoting FRED G.
112 (1962)).

INBAU & JOHN

E.

REIO, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS

105. Id. (quoting from INBAU &

REID,

supra note 104, at 1 1 1).

106. Id. at 455.
107. The Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of common law voluntariness in Bram
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).

v.

108. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980), for example, the police engaged
in what appeared to be a form of trickery that the state supreme court characterized as "sub
tle compulsion," but the United States Supreme Court nonetheless found the resulting
statements admissible. For a discussion of other forms of trickery employed by the police
during interrogation, see generally Magid, supra note 95; White, supra note 95.
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To say that Miranda was concerned with failure of information as
to rights, however, is not to diminish its importance. The right to be
told what one's rights are before they are waived is part of the funda
mental belief structure underlying Anglo-American law. Our law as
sumes autonomous agents capable of acting in their own best interests.
This entails at least some level of information about the consequences
of conduct before one acts in a way that causes a right to be lost. That
is, I believe, the explanation of Miranda's long life. Whether or not the
Fifth Amendment privilege should apply formally to the interrogation
room, it might be that our culture believes, at some intuitive level, in
precisely the kind of notice that Miranda requires. Miranda did not,
after all, forbid police interrogation or require lawyers. It left the deci
sion of whether to answer police questions up to presumably autono
mous agents who have been given information about the conse
quences of answering. It might be that this is simply the fairest
solution to the interrogation problem.
Viewing Miranda as due process fairness explains Doyle v. Ohio,109
where the Court held that the state cannot cross-examine a defendant
about his failure to mention his exculpatory defense when he was ar
rested and given Miranda warnings. The Court found an implicit "as
surance" in the warnings that silence would "carry no penalty." Given
this implicit promise, the Court held that "it would be fundamentally
unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at
trial. "11 0 Here, the warnings create the due process right, rather than
vice-versa,m but Doyle shows an intimate connection between the
warnings and the overall question of fairness to suspects.
As we saw earlier,112 viewing Miranda as providing a threshold
level of fairness in the interrogation room, rather than ameliorating
the pressure of police interrogation, explains the Miranda waiver
cases. It also explains why Dickerson embraced Miranda, however
tepidly. Miranda was not a candidate to be overruled because, in
Dickerson's words, "Miranda has become embedded in routine police
practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our na
tional culture."113 Translated: our culture, and even the police, accept
the fairness of telling the suspect that he does not have to answer po
lice questions and if he does it will hurt his case.
109. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
110. Id. at 618.
1 1 1 . Indeed, in later cases, the Court held that there was no constitutional prohibition
against using silence to impeach an exculpatory trial story when the police did not give
Miranda warnings. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231 (1980).
1 12. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
113. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000).
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That Miranda is more about due process notice .than neutralizing
inherent compulsion seems clear enough in Duckworth v. Eagan.114
Duckworth is rarely analyzed in the literature,115 perhaps because it
suggests a due process framework and thus is not easily analyzed un
der traditional approaches. In Duckworth, the police gave the follow
ing warnings:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.You

have the right to remain silent.Anything you say can be used against you

in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask
you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You
have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot
afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will
be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you
wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the
right to stop answering questions at any time.You also have the right to
stop answering at any time until you've talked to a lawyer.11 6

The problem here, of course, is that the warnings seem to promise
an appointed lawyer only if the suspect is arraigned at some later time.
If Miranda is understood as neutralizing the inherent compulsion of
police interrogation, Duckworth might or might not be consistent with
Miranda. Four members of the Duckworth Court dissented in an
opinion by Justice Marshall that accused the majority of a "continuing
debasement" of Miranda.117 Marshall concluded that "[a]n unwitting
suspect harboring uncertainty [about when he could have a lawyer] is
precisely the sort of person who may feel compelled to talk 'voluntar
ily' to the police, without the presence of counsel, in an effort to extri
cate himself from his predicament. "11 8
Marshall quoted from a state case holding similar warnings unconstitutional under Miranda:
[The suspect] is effectively told that he can talk now or remain in custody
- in an alien, friendless, harsh world - for an indeterminate length of
time. To the average accused, still hoping at this stage to be home on
time for dinner or to make it to work on time, the implication that his
choice is to answer questions right away or remain in custody until that
nebulous time "if and when" he goes to court is a coerced choice of the
most obvious kind.119

1 14. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
115. A notable exception is Yale Kamisar, Duckworth v. Eagan: A Little Noticed
Miranda Case That May Cause Much Mischief, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 550 (1989) (concluding
that Duckworth was wrongly decided).
1 16. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198.
1 17. Id. at 214 (Marshall,

J.,

dissenting).

1 18. Id. at 217.
119. Id. (quoting Dickerson v. State, 276 N.E.2d 845, 852 (Ind. 1972) (DeBruler, J., con
curring in result) (alteration in original)).
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Marshall is co:rrect that, if the principal function of the warnings is
to dispel the inherent compulsion of police interrogation, the warnings
in Duckworth don't seem particularly well fitted for the job.120 If the
principal idea, however, is to provide notice that a suspect does not
have to answer and notice that his answers can be used against him in
court, these warnings work just fine. However much pressure Eagan
still felt to answer police questions after the warnings, he had been
given the requisite notice that he did not have to talk to the police at
all and that he could consult a lawyer before answering questions.
Duckworth contrasts quite nicely, on a due process theory, with
Edwards v. Arizona.121 In Edwards, the Burger Court held, without
dissent,122 that when the suspect requests counsel, police cannot reini
tiate interrogation in the absence of counsel even if the suspect later
waives his rights.123 Putting Duckworth and Edwards together as due
process cases, they stand for the rather simple proposition that the
state must deliver what it promises, but it can make at least some
changes in the Miranda model warnings. The state does not have to
promise to provide an appointed lawyer during the current encounter
with the police (Duckworth) but if the police promise counsel, the po
lice must keep the promise to provide a lawyer during questioning if
the suspect requests one (Edwards). Viewed as due process cases,
rather than as an antidote to inherent compulsion in the interrogation
room, these cases make perfect sense.
Michigan v. Mosley,124 decided six years before Edwards, reached
the opposite result when the suspect invoked his right to remain silent.
The police terminated the initial interrogation, but a different team of
interrogators questioned Mosley two hours later about a different
crime, after once again providing warnings and, this time, getting a
waiver. The Court held that this procedure complied with Miranda.
The distinction between Mosley and Edwards seems consistent with, if
not compelled by, a due process theory. The two kinds of promises are
different. If the state promises the right to a lawyer during interroga
tion, and then begins to interrogate without providing a lawyer, that is
a bright line failure to provide what is promised. If, on the other hand,
the state promises that the suspect has a right to remain silent, the act
of asking again, hours later, and about a different crime, is not the
same kind of bright line failure. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in
Mosley, when the suspect invoked his right to remain silent, the police
120. See also Kamisar, supra note 115, at 554.
121. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
122. Justices Powell and Rehnquist concurred in the result. See id.
123. See also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (making clear that Edwards
requires the lawyer be physically present at any subsequent interrogation).
124. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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immediately ceased questioning. The warnings do not promise that the
police will never again seek to talk to the suspect, and the police ac
tion in Mosley thus seems consistent with a due process notice theory.
We saw earlier that the Court in Quarles held that a police officer
who asks a rape suspect the whereabouts of a gun in a public place
does not have to give Miranda warnings. The Court performed a cost
benefit balance to conclude that the threat to public safety more than
outweighed the benefit of a rule designed to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege. What is missing, again, is an account of why the
Fifth Amendment privilege should not apply when a gun might be in a
supermarket at midnight. As Justice O'Connor recognized in her dis
sent, "since there is nothing about an exigency that makes custodial
interrogation any less compelling, a principled application of Miranda
requires that respondent's statement be suppressed."125 That seems
right even if Miranda is only a "weak force" application of the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
If Miranda is best understood as requiring due process notice that
the suspect does not have to answer questions, however, O'Connor's
dissent misses the point. The majority's balance of the equities might
be wrong, but the attack that the Court is ignoring Fifth Amendment
compulsion goes nowhere. Due process is sufficiently flexible to per
mit - Professor Klein will likely say "amorphous enough to al
low"126- different procedures depending on the cost to the party
charged with the responsibility of providing notice. The Court requires
actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of an es
tate, for example, but notice by publication suffices for all other credi
tors.127 The Court in Quarles concluded that the cost to suspects in
terms of bearing compelling pressures is outweighed, in this instance,
by the cost of greater risk to the public that follows from requiring no
tice. This is a starkly due process form of analysis. I personally think
the Court got the balance wrong in Quarles, but the very act of bal
ancing the social good versus the value of the Fifth Amendment
privilege suggests that Miranda has become, at heart, a due process
case.
Once we realize that the presumption of compulsion is not a doc
trinal imperative, the Court's tendency to balance the equities when
deciding how best to apply the Miranda exclusionary remedy becomes
coherent, if not necessarily the best policy. Return to Harris v. New

125. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 665 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor dissented from the Court's holding that the state
ment was admissible; she concurred in the judgment that the gun should be admitted, though
she used a different analysis to reach that result.
126. Klein, Miranda's Exceptions, supra note 28.
127. See Tulsa ProrI Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).

1110

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1081

York,128 holding that statements taken in violation of Miranda can be
used to impeach. This holding is incoherent if Miranda creates a
"strong force" presumption of compulsion, but it can easily be squared
with a due process notice requirement (or a due process mechanism
for determining when the Miranda "weak force" version of the privi
lege should apply). Although the analysis is cursory, Harris appears to
be balancing the decreased incentive for police to give the warnings
against the loss of trustworthy evidence129 - a balance similar to what
it would do later, and more clearly, in Quarles.
The Court also balances when deciding whether a Miranda viola
tion taints other evidence discovered by means of the violation. In
Michigan v. Tucker,130 for example, the Court had to decide whether to
suppress the testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered
through a Miranda violation. On one side of the balance the Court put
"the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to
the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence
which either party seeks to adduce."131 On the other side, the Court
put the interest in creating an effective sanction for the violation of a
constitutional right. That side of the balance was lighter in Tucker
than in Miranda because Tucker's statements were suppressed. The
question was whether to "extend the excision further . . . and exclude
relevant testimony of a third-party witness."132 That balance came out
against the defendant, as it did in the Fourth Amendment context.133
Physical evidence found by means of a Fourth Amendment viola
tion is, on the other hand, generally suppressed as the poisoned fruit
of the violation.134 If a statement is "actually compelled" - as in
Brown v. Mississippi135- a court would likely suppress physical evi
dence discovered from the statement. To admit the evidence is to re
ward the state for using coercion. To suppress the evidence brings con
fession law into parity with the Fourth Amendment. As to Miranda
violations, however, the Court said in Oregon v. Elstad136 that they
have no poisoned fruit. The rationale should be familiar by now: er
rors "in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures . . . should

128. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
129. See id. at 225-26.
130. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
131. Id. at 450.
132. Id. at 451.
133. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
134. There are, of course, exceptions to this derivative evidence rule, but the details of
Fourth Amendment law are beyond the scope of my paper.
135. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The deputy sheriff and a gang of white men tortured confes
sions from black suspects. The deputy sheriff admitted the torture in court.
136. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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not breed the same irremediable consequence as police infringement
of the Fifth Amendment itself."137
My theory does not provide a different answer or form of analysis
on the question of whether to exclude physical fruits or the testimony
of a witness found by violating Miranda. A due process theory simply
recognizes what the Court has been doing all along - balancing the
notice violation with the interest in admitting reliable evidence. It
makes more sense to balance under the flexible Due Process Clause
than under a Fifth Amendment privilege that otherwise has no excep
tions. The virtue of this approach is, admittedly, also its flaw, as
Professor Klein notes in her Article.138 Due process balancing is a
pretty inexact science. Yet it is what the Court has been doing in
Miranda cases for almost thirty years, and we should at least call it by
its real name - due process.
But my notice theory does provide a more satisfying explanation
for the Elstad holding that a violation of Miranda does not taint a later
statement taken in compliance with Miranda. The Court sought to jus
tify its holding by repeating the Tucker balance: "[T]he absence of any
coercion or improper tactics undercuts the twin rationales - trustwor
thiness and deterrence" that would support a broader rule of exclu
sion.139 If the Miranda concern is really about inherent compulsion,
however, one can argue that Elstad gave the second statement know
ing he had already incriminated himself and thus likely felt the com
pelling pressures of police interrogation all the more acutely. This ar
gument persuaded the state court and the Elstad dissenters. Under a
notice understanding of Miranda that does not presume compulsion,
however, Elstad has no plausible argument. If all Miranda requires is
notice, Elstad has to lose, for he received the notice that was required,
and then made a statement.
There are, I believe, only four ways to line up Dickerson with
Miranda and the many cases interpreting Miranda. First, one can sim
ply accept the idea of a Fifth Amendment "weak force" privilege that
requires notice but often permits a balance between the suspect's in
terests and the state's interest in the admission of reliable evidence.
This leaves things as they were prior to Dickerson and is the least jar
ring solution. Those who, like me, find the idea of a "weak force"
privilege to be ad hoc and unsatisfying have three choices. They can
follow Justices Scalia and Thomas in Dickerson and insist that the
"weak force" cases have deconstitutionalized Miranda. In that event,
137. Id. at 309. The facts of Elstad make clear that the officer did not intentionally omit
the warning to gain an advantage, nor did he seek to exploit the first statement by, for ex
ample, reminding Elstad that he had already incriminated himself. Presumably, the deriva
tive evidence consequences of that kind of police conduct remain unsettled.
138. See Klein, Miranda 's Exceptions, supra note 28.
139. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308.
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of course, Congress can replace the Miranda remedy with anything it
chooses, and the states can ignore Miranda entirely. Paul Cassell
chooses this option.140
Another option is to insist, dicta in Dickerson notwithstanding,
that Miranda meant to apply a "strong force" privilege to the police
station house. This requires revisiting, and probably overruling, most
of the exceptions and limitations created by later Courts. The final op
tion, like the first one, leaves the case law undisturbed. It is to find an
other constitutional "home" for Miranda, to drop the pretense that
everything about Miranda is an extension of one kind or another of
the Fifth Amendment privilege. Miranda is, I have argued, about fair
ness. Its logical home is in the Due Process Clause. If Miranda is
viewed as creating a due process notice requirement, it makes perfect
sense (whether or not it is the right approach for policy reasons) to
have a public safety exception, to permit the use of statements taken
in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes, and to decide that
Miranda has no derivative evidence consequences.
The due process option is a bit more jarring than accepting
Miranda as a "weak force" privilege. I can, however, reduce the dislo
cation. If the reader is wedded to the idea that Miranda is about the
Fifth Amendment privilege, I have argued that the Court's "weak
force" doctrine, in which the Miranda presumption does not apply to
certain categories of cases, is best understood as using a due process
theory to decide when to withdraw the presumption of compulsion.
Thus, whether Miranda's notice requirement is wholly located in the
Due Process Clause or whether the Clause simply tells the Court when
not to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Miranda's presump
tion of compulsion, it is the Due Process Clause that is doing the
heavy lifting.
V.

FITTING MIRANDA INTO D OCTRINAL DUE PROCESS

In this Part, I offer some tentative thoughts about how to fit
Miranda into established due process doctrine. I begin with the
Miranda opinion. While the Court relies heavily on the Fifth
Amendment privilege, it does so in a way that stresses autonomy and
human dignity, as well as the inherently compelling pressures of police
interrogation. The denial of autonomy and human dignity by custodial
interrogation might constitute a deprivation of a due process liberty
interest.
In describing the cases before the Court, the Miranda opinion
noted that, "[i)n each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an un
familiar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation
140. See Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot, 18 U.S. C. § 3501 and the Over
hauling ofMiranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1999).
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procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent [in
two of the cases]."141 While there was no evidence of "physical coer
cion or patent psychological ploys . . . in none of these cases did the of
ficers undertake . . . appropriate safeguards at the outset of the inter
rogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free
choice. "142
Still talking about the cases before the Court, the majority noted
that the "interrogation environment is created for no purpose other
than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This at
mosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. . . . not physical in
timidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity."143 Perhaps
most squarely relevant to my due process point, the Court concluded
that "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on in
dividual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals."144 These
descriptions of the interrogation procedure persuade me that forcing a
suspect to endure that procedure amounts to a deprivation of a due
process interest in liberty.
The Fourteenth Amendment sometimes requires notice before the
State imposes a restriction on liberty. A parolee, for example, has a
right to notice of the potential revocation of his parole.145 A prisoner
has a right to notice that the prison officials intend to deprive him of
good time credit on his sentence.146 In the custodial interrogation con
text, the suspect might have a due process liberty interest not to be
forced to endure interrogation. Even though the suspect is in custody,
the police interrogation is a further deprivation of his liberty. To be
sure, the marginal deprivation of liberty associated with enduring po
lice interrogation is not as great as the marginal deprivation of liberty
associated with loss of parole or good time credits. It is not clear, how
ever, that the extent of the marginal deprivation is necessarily disposi
tive.
If interrogation intrudes on a due process liberty interest, the due
process liberty cases seem to require warnings that a suspect has a
right to remain silent and a right to consult with counsel, both of which
permit the suspect to terminate the procedure that is depriving her of
liberty. The warning that the answers can be used against her in court
is more difficult to justify under this conception of the liberty interest
that is at stake. Perhaps it can be justified as informing the suspect of

141. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 455.
145. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
146. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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reasons why she might want to terminate the interrogation. Due
process is, as I have said, flexible.
A second sort of due process liberty interest is the suspect's option
to make an informed choice whether to answer police questions and
risk providing the state with evidence against him that increases the
risk of conviction. This is perhaps analogous to the parolee's interest
in notice and a chance to contest the parole revocation hearing or the
prisoner's right to notice and a chance to contest the loss of good time
credits. The suspect has both a stronger and a weaker argument than
the parolee or prisoner. It is stronger because a suspect is not yet con
victed. He still benefits from the presumption of innocence, and the
scope of his potential loss of liberty is almost total, rather than incre
mental as in the case of the parolee and, particularly, the prisoner,
both of whom are already under state control. The suspect's argument
is weaker because the notice given the prisoner and the parolee per
mits them to challenge directly the grounds the state has for a further
deprivation of liberty. The suspect has to make a more attenuated
causal argument that this liberty interest is threatened. He faces depri
vation of liberty by means of a conviction only at a later proceeding,
where the state has the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reason
able doubt, and where the state likely has evidence other than the
statement he gave without making a fully informed choice to answer.
Dicta in some of the due process cases support this kind of causal
chain. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ,147 the Court
noted that "[t]his right to be heard has little reality or worth unless
one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."148 Given the fre
quent expression of concern in Miranda about free choice to decide
whether to answer questions, it is conceivable that the lack of notice
about the effect of answering infringes on the suspect's liberty interest
in deciding whether to cooperate in his own conviction. The focus in
the Miranda opinion is on the harm that would result from a statement
that "was not made knowingly or competently because of the failure
to apprise him of his rights."149 If this argument is right, it provides
ample justification not only for a duty to warn of the right to silence
and to counsel but also for a duty to warn a suspect that his answers
can be used against him in court.
Police interrogation threatens a suspect's liberty in another, more
fundamental way. One historical explanation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege asserts that it is wrong to compel someone to reveal his in
nermost self, his conscience, his beliefs. At least when the privilege
147. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
148. Id. at 314.
149. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465.
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was taking shape in England and colonial America, religious beliefs
were constitutive of persons. To compel someone to disclose his re
ligious belief was thus to "take" an aspect of his liberty.
Miranda quoted with enthusiastic approval language that the
privilege grants a defendant the "right to a private enclave where he
may lead a private life."150 If the police do not warn the suspect that he
has no duty to answer questions, they are intruding on this private en
clave and infringing on the suspect's liberty interest in choosing
whether to reveal his innermost thoughts. Of course, suspects today
are not in any way like the religious dissenters of Tudor England.
Rather, my claim is that we view state compelled responses to ques
tions as an invasion of the liberty interest not to disclose what we wish
to keep secret. If the police warn a suspect that he has no duty to an
swer questions and the suspect proceeds to give a statement, then it is
fair to presume that the suspect chose to disclose his private thoughts.
There is, then, no infringement of liberty.
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment might have contem
plated a similar liberty interest. There is abundant evidence that the
Fourteenth Amendment was understood to protect the free expres
sion of ideas and, thus, to protect the person who utters words.151 A
colorful example of this concern was Congressman Price's observation
that "if a citizen of a free State visiting a slave State expressed his
opinion in reference to slavery he was treated without much ceremony
to a coat of tar and feathers and a ride upon the rail."152 Though these
remarks referenced the time before the abolition of slavery, the
speaker made clear that nothing had changed in the post-bellum
South. Others in Congress echoed the concern about the lack of free
speech in the South. Representative Mann of Pennsylvania noted that
whoever "went down South was obliged to put a padlock on his
mouth."153 The South's repression of dissent on the race question was
an issue of national importance. Michael Curtis has concluded, "De
nial of First Amendment rights [by the Southern states] was a recur
ring theme" of the election of 1866.154 The benevolent effect of pro
tecting free speech in the South appears occasionally in the sparse
records of the ratification debates in the state legislatures.155
150. Id. at 460 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
151. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 36-41, 50, 56 (1986).
152. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1066 (1868).
153. CURTIS, supra note 151, at 148. See also id. at 148-49 (quoting Representative
M'Camant, also of Pennsylvania).
154. CURTIS, supra note 151, at 138. In Curtis's fascinating account of speeches, news
paper accounts, and reports from the election of 1866, covering fifteen pages, there is a sin
gle reference to problems in the criminal systems and dozens of references to deprivation of
First Amendment freedoms. See id. at 131-45.
155. See id.
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We can thus accept that the Framers and ratifying legislatures
wished to require the states to permit freedom of speech and expres
sion. When the Court began to entertain the idea that Fourteenth
Amendment due process protected freedom of expression from state
infringement, the analytical structure centered on the "liberty" pro
tected by the Due Process Clause.156 Although the liberty to decide
whether to answer police questions is different from the liberty to ex
press opinions without penalty, there are common threads. In both
cases, the one claiming the liberty interest is facing the power of the
state, and the state is seeking to use speech to harm the interests of the
speaker/suspect.
If we understand the relevant liberty interest as a right to decide
what the state is permitted to learn about our thoughts, it helps ex
plain Schmerber v. California.157 The issue in Schmerber was whether,
by forcing the extraction of Schmerber's blood and thus revealing that
he was intoxicated, the state was compelling him to be a witness
against himself. The Court held that Schmerber's blood was not being
a witness against him even though, as Justice Black pointed out in his
dissent, the blood was "testifying" against Schmerber just as surely as
if it had taken the witness stand.
Justice Black commented that it was a "strange hierarchy of values
that allows a State to extract a human being's blood to convict him of
a crime but proscribes compelled production of his lifeless papers."158
At one level, there is much to commend Black's view that compelling
a defendant to bear witness against himself violates the Fifth
Amendment without regard to whether the human will is involved in
the act of witnessing. One response to Justice Black is that when the
state requires the human actor to choose to incriminate himself, it
forces him to give up some aspect of the human personality, some di
mension of autonomy or dignity.
This is a satisfying explanation for why the Court refused to accept
Black's argument that Schmerber's blood was a witness against
Schmerber. On this view of the Fifth Amendment privilege, it creates
a kind of liberty interest in not facing compelling pressures to provide
answers at trial. There is no particular reason why the Due
Process Clause could not embody a similar liberty interest as applied

156. See, e.g. , Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
157. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
158. Id. at 775 (Black, J., dissenting). The reference to "compelled production of his
lifeless papers" was to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Fifth Amendment as
pect of which the Court has subsequently overruled. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976). Nonetheless, sometimes the act of producing papers can itself be a testimonial
act (as by implicitly authenticating documents) that cannot be compelled. Thus, Justice
Black's larger point remains valid.
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to police interrogation. This liberty interest would likely require a
warning that the suspect need not answer.
I have tried to demonstrate that custodial interrogation without
warnings directly infringes a due process liberty interest in deciding
what information to provide police interrogators during custodial in
terrogation. I have also argued that a suspect should have a right to
terminate the police interrogation, which is, itself, a deprivation of his
due process liberty interest. If the reader is unpersuaded by either of
these "pure" due process arguments, I am prepared to fall back on an
alternative argument - one that least roils the waters of the Miranda
doctrine. Even if Miranda's presumption of compulsion is based on
the Fifth Amendment privilege, when the Court decides whether to
apply the Miranda exclusionary rule, it must engage in a due process
balance that puts fairness to the suspect on one side and the interests
of the state in accurate fact-finding on the other.
I concede that my arguments might not be adequate to justify cre
ating a Miranda due process liberty interest if we were starting from
scratch. Nor do I think that the Miranda Court intended to create a
due process right to notice. I take the Court at its word that it sought
to apply the Fifth Amendment privilege to the police interrogation
room. The timidity of the application, however, coupled with a fairly
hostile reaction to Miranda by later Courts, has, I believe, transformed
Miranda into a due process case. To be sure, Professor Klein is right to
claim that my theory mixes up procedural and substantive due process,
producing a mulligan stew unrecognizable in the Court's current due
process doctrine.159 My reply, of course, is that it is the Court that has
done the mixing, but that the stew is reasonably tasty.
VI. . A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT SUSAN KLEIN 'S ARTICLE
I applaud Professor Klein's account of prophylactic rules. She ar
gues that these rules should be considered temporary place holders
necessary to protect an underlying constitutional right but "fully open
to revision by Congress, federal executive action, and state legislative,
executive or judicial action."160 This account is consistent with the dis
tinction I have drawn between "weak force" application of the privi
lege and a true prophylactic protection. It contemplates a rich and
continuing dialogue among the Court, Congress, state legislatures,
state and federal law enforcement agencies, and social scientists. The
social scientists will tell us whether a particular right needs prophylac
tic protection and the shape and scope of the prophylaxis, and the
other groups will contribute their expertise and communicate their
political needs.
159. See Klein, Miranda's Exceptions, supra note 28.
160. Klein, supra note 23, at 1054.
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The frank recognition that the Court often creates rules designed
to protect constitutional values, rather than always interpreting the
Constitution itself, would go far toward creating a legitimacy for
criminal procedure doctrine that has been largely missing since the
Warren Court began to expand the criminal protections available in
state court. Professor Klein apologizes for not being sufficiently cyni
cal,161 but I think she's right to call for this kind of dialogue. She admits
to a concern about whether the Court is institutionally capable of do
ing a good job with empirical data - a concern that I share. The reli
ance on empirical data, however, provides a more satisfactory anchor
than mere reliance on the intuition of the Court. Moreover, it finds a
robust role for other institutions in protecting constitutional rights, a
refreshing change from the Court's usual approach to the task of pro
tecting rights.
Dickerson is, of course, inconsistent with Professor Klein's project.
Rather than admit Miranda is prophylactic, and invite Congress to
have another go at creating an alternative remedy, the Court
woodenly insisted that Miranda was constitutional even though it gave
no explanation of its relationship to the Fifth Amendment privilege.
On Professor Klein's account, Dickerson is a missed opportunity for
dialogue.162 I agree with her, though on my account, the Court owed us
no explanation of how Miranda is connected to the Fifth Amendment
privilege because the Court has, in effect, already provided an expla
nation by moving Miranda to the Due Process Clause.
I don't claim that my Miranda-as-notice explanation fits perfectly
with the entire opinion in Miranda or with all the language and analy
sis in the cases that followed. I like very much Susan Klein's alterna
tive explanation of the Miranda exceptions. On her account, most of
the Miranda exceptions can be explained as a sort of collective good
faith exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule. Except for
Quarles,163 the cases finding exceptions to Miranda's rule of suppres
sion involve failures to comply through inadvertence, rather than an
attempt to gain an advantage over the suspect. In Elstad, the Court
even stressed the minor, good-faith nature of the failure to provide
Miranda warnings during the initial interaction.164
On this attractive account, the various collateral uses to which the
state may put statements taken in violation of Miranda crucially de
pend on the good-faith nature of the violation. Should the police in
tentionally violate Miranda to gain an advantage, the state could then
161. See Klein, Miranda's Exceptions, supra note 28.
162. See Klein, supra note 23, at 1077.
163. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
164. The Court noted that the violation was a "simple failure to administer the warn
ings," to be contrasted with "actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine
the suspect's ability to exercise his free will." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
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not benefit from the Miranda exceptions. This solves the problem of
"questioning outside Miranda" that Professor Charles Weisselberg has
documented.165
As intuitively appealing as this explanation is, its connection with
the Fifth Amendment privilege is tenuous. It is hard to figure out what
the officer's intentions have to do with the Fifth Amendment privilege
not to be compelled to give answers unless we assume, as Professor
Klein does, that an intentional violation of Miranda is more likely to
be part of a coercive environment. But compulsion depends on the
perception of the suspect, not the intent of the interrogator. To tell
Elstad, "I think you were involved in a robbery" might or might not be
compelling.166 That the officer intended to evade Miranda does not
make it more compelling. Whatever the value of the officer's intent as
a bright line for locating violations of the Fifth Amendment privilege,
that intent should be part of a due process balance. Perhaps Professor
Klein has simply provided a better description of how the Court con
ducts the Miranda due process balance than I have managed to do!
CONCLUSION
It should not surprise us that no theory fits perfectly with all the
Miranda "data." The Miranda doctrine has evolved over three dec
ades, often with Courts that were at least somewhat hostile. I have at
tempted to show, throughout this Article, that a due process explana
tion of Miranda and its progeny is basically consistent with the thrust
of the Court's Miranda opinion itself and is a better fit with the pre
scribed remedy, the waiver standard, and the subsequent case law than
the two traditional explanations of Miranda
that it is co-extensive
with the Fifth Amendment privilege or that it is a weak force applica
tion of the Fifth Amendment that sometimes does not function the
same as the strong force version of the privilege. Professor Klein's
theory of the Miranda exceptions is also a worthy alternative to these
standard explanations, though I think her theory partakes of due pro
cess more than she admits.
When I was in law school, the seminal due process notice case in
civil procedure was Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. , 1 67
holding that the bank had to provide actual notice of a judicial settle-

165. This practice consists of obtaining statements by telling suspects that what they say
cannot be used against them in court because they have not been given Miranda warnings.
The police hope to get a statement that can be used to impeach or to find other evidence.
Here the intentional nature of the violation is manifest. See Charles D. Weisselberg, In the
Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1 121 (2001); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998).
166. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301 (describing an officer testifying that "I told Mr. Elstad
that I felt he was involved in that [robbery]").
167. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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ment to beneficiaries of a common trust fund if the bank knew their
place of residence. At the time, and for decades thereafter, it never
occurred to me that Mullane could have anything to do with Miranda.
But that was, of course, because they were separated at birth. Today I
see the family resemblance. Miranda, meet Mullane, your long-lost
sibling.

